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Abstract
This paper discusses the effectiveness of credit policies during the early stage of
economic development in Japan and Korea. We examine the importance of institutional
arrangements for managing credit policies in these two countries. We emphasize participatory
government intervention, where credit policies could be viewed as part of an internal allocation
mechanism: government, banks and large industrial firms may be said to have formed what we
call a "government-led intemal organization" (GLIO). We examine the theoretical foundations
of this view and discuss the implications for the efficiency of credit allocation. We argue that,
in early economic development, such a participatory approach may have helped overcome
pervasive market imperfections. But there were also significan. dangers - problems of
entrenched interests ond institutional inertia. In both countries, the relative importance of GLIO
gradually diminished as competitive capital markets and large conglornerates ("privately-led
internal organizations" or PLIO) expanded with economic growth.
Introduction
The remarkable success of the East Asian economies has refueled old debates on
the,role of the government in econoimic development. One significant branch of this debate has
centered on the merits of government intervention in credit markets: can it successfully promote
industrialization and growth in the early stage of economic development?
The only simple answer to this question is that there is no simple answer.
Throughout the world, examples abound where government intervention in the credit market has
led to large loan defaults, inefficient financial institutions, and poor resource mobilization
without encouraging growti in targeted sectors or industries. If we compare credit programs
and interest rate policies in African, Latin American and East Asian countries, it is difficult to
find clear and significant differences in the individual program structures. This leads us to
examnine nore fundamental aspects of credit market intervention.
Our research focuses on the nature of the policy environments in which the
programs were implemented in Japan and Korea. We discuss the Korean experience during the
period of 1960s to 1980s, and aspects of the Japanese experience 1930s-60s, i.e., the rapid
industrialization period. What we believe is of central importance, but is often not vell
understood, is that the success of credit policies is strongly influenced by how they are managed
and what type of institutional environments support them. Although countries may target the
same industries and borrowers, results may differ, depending on how closely credit programs
are monitored, how well they are managed and how careftilly they are coordinated with other
policy measures. The eff6ctiveness of credit policies depends on targeting the right groups of
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borrowers, on monitoring the performance Lf these borrowers and, more broadly, on crafting
an environment that ensures the success of the supported firms or industries. Furthermore there
is a need for flexibility of the policy instruments and a willingness to adjust policies in response
to changing economic circumstances. All these aspects of effective policy management and
implementation rely heavily on the institutional environment, the formal and informal
arrangements that establish the relationship between the government, business, and financial
institutions.
In the two East Asian countries we consider, during their earlier stages of
economic development, the government played a significant role in the credit market. We argue
that there were important common elements in the nature of the government's involvement in
the credit market. Intervention was based on a participatory view on the role of the government.
The government, the financial sector and the large industrial firms shared a conr1mon
responsibility in the allocation of credit. We call this affiliation the "government-led internal
organization" (GLIO).'
Within the GLIO, there was much emphasis on communication, coordination and
cooperation. These relationships were supported by institutional arrangements such as
deliberative rouncils, industry associations, federation of industrialists, monthly export
promotion meetings, etc. In this paper, we attempt to explain how and why these aspects should
be considered central to the understanding of the effectiveness of credit policies in Japan and
Korea.
We focus mostly on examining the effectiveness of credit policies in terms of their
"internal consistency": How well were policies were implemented? What were the incentives
to the government, to banks and to firms? And in what sense do information and decision rights
matter? We also consider aspects of tle external consistency of credit policies, i.e. how well
credit policies in this institudonal environment were integrated into the broader structure of
industrial and macroeconomic policy making.
While in both countries aspects of participatory government and aspects of internal
organization were prevalent, the actual institutional environment, and especially the degree of
government intervention, differed significantly. In Korea, the government owned the major
commercial banks and specialized banks. The government employed tight controls on interest
rates and directed loans to support specific sectors and industries, allocating more than half of
bank credit in directed programs. In Japan, government intervention in the credit market was
This concept is similar to Lee (1992).
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less extensive and more indirect. The policy directed loans were extended mainly by
government-owned specialized financial institutions, such as Japan Development Bank (JDB).
The commercial banks were privately owned, but the government indirectly influenced their
lending. The government controlled interest rates, and overall a substantial amount of loans
were directed by policy.2
Another aspect we stress is the dynamics of governm( lt intervention in the credit
market. How did the role of the government in credit markets change in the process of
economic development? We argue that the comparative advantages of the governments'
involvement in Japan and Korea were greatest at the early stages of their economic development.
Buz as their economies approached levels of more developed economies, the centrality of
governments became a hinderance to further growth. While some structural transformations
were clearly visible, and in particular a shift from the GLIO to an economy with several large
conglomerates and more market-based system, we also argue that the efficient devoludonary
process faced opposition from entrenched interest in bureaucracy and business commu,iity, which
was favored by the status quo and adamant to institutional change.
The central purpose of this paper is therefore to gain a greater conceptual
understanding of the essential elements of the institutional structure that supported government
intervention in the credit market in these two countries. The underlying hypothesis is that this
institutional anrangement explains at least some of the differences between the Japanese and
Korean experiences with credit policies, which seemed to have at least some success, and the
many experiences in other developing countries, which have been considered failures.3
Furthe- Motivation
Our emphasis on understanding the institutional environment when considering
effectiveness of credit policies is unlike much of the p.evious analysis on credit policy.
Consequently, it may be useful to provide some further motivation before going into the main
part of the paper. We review four broad reasons why we stress the institutional approach.
F: st, the debate on the effectiveness of government intervention in the credit
market has often focused solely on issues of financial repression. This analysis focases on
See Japan Development Bank and Japan Economic Research Institute (1993).
To address these important issues more directly, a proper comparative analysis would be required. This
is beyond the scope of this paper. This paper chooses to concentrate on only one side of tne compariso
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situations where government controls over interest rates result in artificially low or even negative
real rates, and where banks make substantial loans to the government or to government-
designatd sectors. The lower the interest rate ceilings and the larger the proportion of funds
directed, the heavier the financial system is said to be repressed.
In practice, however, the dimensions of government control over the financial
system are more complex. In assessing the role of government in the credit market, one should
beware of applying too simplistic measures. In many cases, the government influence over the
credit allocation could be much stronger even though the interest rate is mildly repressed, and
the amount of explicitly labeled -elective credit programs are relatively small. For example,
Japan or T'aiwan (China) had reasonably high real interest rates, and relatively few (explicitly
labeled) directed credit programs compared to many other developing countries during the early
period of economic development. Nevertheless, this does not rrm.,.n that the role of government
in credit allocatiors was less significant in Japan or Taiwan (China) than, for exarnple, in Sierra
Leone or the Philippines. There the government could exercise only a limited degree of
influence over commercial banks, even if interest rate levels were more severely distorted and
selective credit programs were more complicated. Similarly, one may not assess the degree of
government intervention in a country over time by simply looking at one or two variables. For
example, Korea doubled the level of interest rate, yielding highly positive real rates in 1965,
-.vhich was often interpreted as financial liberalization. But in faci this strengthened the role of
government in credit allocation by shifting financial resources from the unregulated curb market
to the banks which were under the tight control of the govemment 4
Second, economists tend to dichotomize market competition and government
intervention, and tend to equate market competition with efficient allocation and govemment
intervention with distortion. In practice, many transactions, even in the most free competitive
market economies like the United States, are made within internal organizations, such as large
industrial firms, at non-market determined prices. Such transactions are based on administrative
decisions, not on prices.5 Intemal organizations and internal markets exist mainly to reduce the
transaction costs, risks and uncertainties that prevent the establishment of efficient markets.
We can view govemment control of the financial system in a similar context. In
F See Cho and Kim (1993).
A' To take a simp c amrt", a businessman would not contracr for a rypist every time he needed a docwnent
to be Wyped, searching for the lowest bidfrom several typists, Instead, the businessman would employ a
:ypist Thus,. ernal orgatai- is an efficient outrcome in the presence ofpervasive market imperfections,
and high transacaion costs.
other words, in the early stage of economic development, when market imperfections are
pervasive and only few banks and industrial firms are important, an economy may find it more
efficient to form a kind of internal capital market and direct credits by administrative decisions.
Viewed this way, govemment control of k redit allocation or "financial repression" might be
interpreted as an efficient response to peivasive credit market imperfections in the early stages
of development.
Third, an issue which has not been paid much attention in the current debate on
the effectiveness of credit policy is the effectiveness of government's 'economic management".
For business firms, good management is said to We the "alphd and omega". The performance
of firms, although they are producing the same kinds of product and employing the same input
mix, can be widely different, depending on the effectiveness of management. Although
economists nowadays often stress the importance of appreciating good firms vs bad firms or
good workers vs bad workers,6 they have not come to fully recognize that there could be good
and bad government or good and bad policy implementation. Indeed, while economists have
recognized that there are some merits for govemment intervention in certain areas, they have
often compared these to a simplistic notion of government failLre. What needs to be studied is
precisely what contributes to "good economic management" or "good policy implementation."
Good management, even for an economy, is not always least management. It requires effective
incentives schemes to motivate the members of the organization, and close monitoring of their
performance. We argue that government control cver credit should also be understood in light
of governance structures. Credit allocation was used as a powerful instrument for governance
control over industrial firns in Korea, and to some extent, in Japan. Again we argue that the
effectiveness of using credit for such purposes depended to a great extent on an appropriate
institutional environment.
Fourth, the role of government and the merit of government intervention should
be understood in a dynamic context. In the early stage of development, when many markets are
missing, and the existing markets are highly imperfect, and when private sector institutions are
poorly developed, the government can play an important role in overcoming some of these
problems. However, in the later stage of economic development, when the private industrial
sector becomes more sophisticated, the merits of govemment intervention may diminish
significantly. Effectiveness of credit policies should always be weighed against the specifics of
the economic backdrop.
Yl The recent deba*es about corporate control dwell exnsively on this issue. This recognition har also
become the basis for a large part of the asymmetric infomrrion theories.
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The remainder of the paper is urganized as follows. The first section briefly
reviews the theoretical rationale of government intervention in the credit market. The second
section describes the main features of the institutonal settings in Japan and Korea, the incentive
environments for banks and industrial firms, in whict. credit policies were implemented. The
third section, based on recent theories of internal organization, provides an in-depth analysis on
how we can try to understand some of the unique aspects of the Japanese and Korean experience
with credit market interventions. The fourth sectit n discusses the diminishing merit of credit
policies as their negative effects become more significant in the process of successful
development. The last section summarizes and concludes the paper.
1. The Role of Government in Credit Markets: A Theoretical Background
In th- section we address three questionis )iat relate to whether government
intervention in the credit market could be an effective measure to facilitate industrialization and
growth, First, does the govemment have a potential role in improving Lhe resource allocation
in the economy? Second, if so, should the government's role be fo direct credit policy, or
should other measures such as a lump sum tax/subsidy be employed to improve resource
allocation? Third, if the govemment should use direct credit policy, under what circumstances
could credit policies be an effective instrument for industrial development?
1.1 Recent Economic Theory on the Role of Government
The fundamental theorems of welfare econoriics (Arrow-Debreu) have formed the
theoretical underpinning ,o the laissez faire view of the role of government. Under certain
assumptions, private markets efficiently allocate resources; therefore government intervention
is unnecessary and could be harmful. Distancing itself from this paradigm, a large body of
literature has developed on identifying market failures, such as externalities, public goods and
increasing returns to scale. Market failures give a fairly apparent and well-defined :ole to the
government for specific policies.
Recently, economists have focused on market imperfections, rather than on market
failures,' where asymmetries of information and other transaction costs obstruct the smooth
functioning of the price system. The argument applies to credit markets, where transactions
differ in important ways from the exchange of neoclassical goods. Since credit is only a promise
rather than a commodity, credit markets require a great deal of information and strong
1' This distincdion is used for expositional clarity. bu neither of these terms are used consistrntly in the
iiterature.
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institutions to enforce contracts. The discussion in the recent literature on imperfect capall
mlarkets can be summarized broadly in four conclusionF. First, some classes of bo:rowers may
be excluded from the credit nmarket (in other words, credit may be rationed). Second, an
imperfect capital market may provide insufficient risk-sharing, so that borrowers become
excessively risk-averse. Third, the capital market may exert pressures on borrowers to maintain
high short-term profitability at the expense of long-term investments (in other words, short-
termism). Finally, the public good aspect of monitoring, and the problems of delegated
monitoring, may result in too little and too diffuse monitoring being provided by the market.
These conclusions give a potentcl role to the government to improve on market failures and
imperfections.
Despite the recognition of market imperfections, however, the question remains
oin the government's role in modern economic theory: why should the government go where
private markets fear to tread? Even if a government is aware of biases in credit allocation, it
may not be able to overcome the problems of asymmetric infoimatlc, and transaction costs.
Therefore, although current economic thinking recognizes the potential for government
intervention in the financial market, it does not necessarily support government intervention to
alleviate market imperfections.
1.2 Why is Intervention in the Credit Market Necessary or Preferred?
If a government is in a sufficiently good position to identify and address the
problems that arise frorrm market imperfections, why should government use credit supports (in
other words, preferential access to credit or subsidized interest rates) to a6dress these problems?
Why can't market failures be addressed by other mechanisms, such as fiscal incentives or
input/output subsidies? These questions have not been ciscussed extensively in the literaturZ.
Here we provide some explanations.
First, there are cases where problems originate in imperfect financial maikets.
For example, when a firm faces a binding financial constraint, such as a cash constraint due to
a temporary external shock, ' 4nds can be obtained either in the form of capital (i.e., issuing r.ew
shares) or credit. However, transaction cost involved in raising funds in the capital market
could be prohibitively high for firms in developing countries, especially when current profit
trends are bad in view of external shock. Also, when product market failures arise, they are
often linked to capital market failures. Credit policies could be very flexible and effective
See Jensen-Mecklin (1976), Stiglitz-Weiss (1981,x, Stiglitz (198.5), Cho (1986b) and Hfellnann (1992). For
a good general discussion, see Stiglitz (1992).
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instruments to address these problems.
Second, credit policy as an industrial pulicy instrument does not simply depend
on the amount of support, but on the timing of the subsidy and the -esulting flexibility. Credit
policies may permit subsidies to be liocated flexibly, and nmay take into account the
performance of supported firms oi industries. Credit support can avoid the ""lumpiness" and
"iasset specificity" (Williams 1985) which are often ca:ailed with fiscal supports. Sinc many
loans must be refinanced, well-measured refinancing decisions provide inceo.ives and determine
the ongoing selection of who receives support. gooo performance can be rewarded by rolling
over existing debt or extending new debt, and bad performance or th, diversion of funds can be
punished by reducing or terminating supn-.ort.9 Furthermore, in an ongoing credit relationship
the govemment has ar. irnterest in rc'^uperating its loans, and the subsidized firm has an inter-st
in continued support. In the language of Williamson (1985), the two parties create "r.iutual
hostages". The government as creditor also obtains some explicit governance rights over '.he
subsidized firms. Therefore, it may have less moral hazard effect than grart or tax subsicy.
Third, apart from purely economic reasoning, creiit policies also have the
advantages of political ease of implementation, and a certain degree of autonomy from social and
political pressure.'0 Budgetary measures, such as fiscal incentives, must be approved by the
legislative branch. Sinre directed credit is decided upon by the government or the central banks,
it may benefit from greater administrative flexibility and (limited) insulation, compared to tax
measures, from politicization of the decision making process. Governments may be able to
formulate policy and policy changes faster, especially for the sectors that should become the
beneficiaries of government policies. Tax administrations in developing countries are often
poorly developed and are unlikely to be able to effectively impleineuit industrial policies.
1.3. Under What Circumstances Could Credit Policies Be Effective?
In order to successfully implement credit policies ane promote industrialization
F' The benefits from theficibiliry of credit policies cannot be taken for gratued. Poor informaion may turn
potential effectiveness into a large hazard, renegotir,ions and refinancing decisions involve delicese trade-
offs. In order to make good use of credit as a s-lect, and incenrive device, creditors must understand tiwo
crucial aspects of afirm 's performance. First, to provide an effective incentive scheme, the creditor should
be able to distinguish external factors from managerial performance. Second, to make effective selection
decisions among the external factors, creditors should be able to distinguish yvclical from structural
influences, and they should have good information on whether financial distress is due to temporary or
permanent problems.
LW This, of course, depends on the government's adrministrative structure, the political environment and its kind
of lerdership.
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and economic growth, government commitment should be firm and visible, and should be
supported by strong political leadership." The Japanese and Korean c.onoinies succeeded in
mobilizing national consensuses for economic gro-wth as their highest national goal-,. The
political environment, the stability of the administration, and the govemment organizational
structure (for example, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) of Korea, the Ministry of
International Trade and Irdustry (MITI) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) of lapan) might
have contributed to the process. in these circumstances, policy makers were able to use longer
planning horizons, thus problems of short-termism were alleviated and stronger commitments
(the "repeated game" effect) were made, both of which were essential to implemernt he --owth
policies. The governments also protected their economic policy making and implementation
from social and political influences that could have pushed for more redistributional goals.
Ft'rthermore, macroeconomic stab.lity (at least avoidance of hyperinflation) was
crucial for reducing the volatility o. relative prices for long-term investnient planning,
mobilization of finarncial savings, and establishing the creditability of the government industrial
policy goals. Without macroeconomic stability, credit interventions typically ent dl larger than
intended subsidies, and th;ey are more likely to be subject to hard-to-detect corruption and abuse.
In highly unstable macro-economic environment, credit policies can have unintended effects:
as witnessed in many other deveioping countries, they may then add to the instability and be in
the way of financial deepening and growth.
However, macroeconomic stability and firm govemment commitments alone do
not seem to have been sufficient for the credit policies to contribute to high economic growth."2
We argue that ii addition. governments must be able to effectively manage and imilement the
credit policies to serve their original ourposes. This required well established institutional
settings to identify problems promptly. to monitor effectively and to transmit specific policies
into desired goals.
It is on these arguments that we want to focus on in the next two sections. We
begin by discussing the institutional settings in Japan and Korea, that may have significantly
Li/ Government commitment is less trivial than it mav sound. This is perhaps one (of impc.rantfactors that can
explain the different in the impact of credit pu.'icies on economic growth between East Asia and South Asia.
Many credit policies have been criticized for not achieving economic growth, when their true (although
possibly covert) purpose was to redistribute and to rieet the interests of vested groups. If credit policiesfail
because of these reasons. it says little about whether directed credit policies were ineffective as g tool for
exmedifin2 economic erowth.
L2T 7here was also the issue of choosing the right policies-especially the right mix of policies. We address this
problem briefly in section 2.4.
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strengthened the positive aspects of credit policies.
2. Institutional Settings and the Effectiveness of Credit Policies in Japan and Korea
In :tis section we discuss the experiences of credit policies in Japan and Korea.
We are looking at the period from the 1930s to the early 1960s in Japan and from the 1960s to
the early 1980s in Korea, i.e., rapid industrialization period. Our main focus is on the
institutional settings which supported the effective management and implementation of credit
policies. We emphasize the interrelations between the relevant decision making units: the
government, banks and industrial firms. We characterize this institutional settings by the
GLIO.'3 It should however be noted up front that the notion of a GLIO should be understood
somewhat differently in Japan than in Korea. In Japan the interactions in the GLIO are based
much more on aspects of honzontal coordination between fairly autonomous decision makers,
whereas in Korea the GLIO has a more centralistic and coercive nature. Nevertheless we find
the concept of the GLIO useful to highlight similarities in the institutional settings.
Section 2.1 provides a broad overview. Section 2.2 and 2.3 look at the incentive
environment of banks and firms respectively. Section 2.4 briefly discusses the some issues of
how credit policies interacted with other policy instruments.
2.1 Relationships Between Government, Banks and Firms in Japan and Korea
This section traces out the broad contour of the institutional relationships between
the government, banks, and industrial firms in Korea and Japan in the early stage of economic
development. To simplify the discussion, we limit ourselves to a very stylized picture and
ignore many details and differenc2s between the two countries."4
Japaitese Structure: The banking sectof can be divided into two major components. There were
the large govemment financial institutlons such as the JDB, the Export-Import Bank of Japan
(EXIM), and, at least before the war, the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ).'5 These channeled
Li/ We explore the theoretical foundwions go this concept in greater detail in section 3 and 4.
Further useful references for these countries include Aoki (1988,1990,1992), Cho(1986a,1989,1990), Cho
and Kim (1993), Cole-Patrick (1986), Drake (1986), Hong-Park (1986), Horiuchi (1984), Horiuchi-Packer-
Fuklda (1988), Kato et. al. (1993), Johnson (1982), Kim-Utterback (1989), Lee (1992), Lim (3989), Nam,
D. W (1992), Nam, S. (1992), Noguchi (1992), Prowse (1992),, Sakakibara-Feldman (1983), Sheard
(1989,1991), Vittas-Wang (1991), Wade (1990) and the World Development Report (1989).
LI/ MAfter the war, the 18) was privazized, but it maintaired very close contacts with the government.
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loans under the government's industrial policy framework. In addition to these, there were
commercial banks, which were privately owned. The government and the central bank (Bank
of Japan (BOJ)) exercised strong influence over the entire banking system through its power of
licensing entry and establishing brancl'es in specific areas, through its discretionary purchases
of debentures issued by the banks, and through the "overloans" provided by BOJ. Particularly
during the war timc and the period of postwar rapid economic growth (1950's and 1960's),
directed credit constituted a large share of total credit (Nakamura 1983, Noguchi 1992,
JDB/JERI 1993). The government began intervening heavily in credit allocation in the 1930s
for the promotion of heavy and chemical industries, at first through the IBJ, and then later, also
through the private commercial banks. The Temporary Funds Adjustment Law, enacted from
1937 to the end of World War II, directed about 70 percent of total credit to industrial sector:
31 percent to machinery, 21 percent to metal, 11 percent to the chemical industry, as versus,
say, 1 percent to food.16 The postwar directed credit included the "fiscal and loan investment
programs" operated by government financial institutions which alone accounted well over 10
percent of loans by whole financial institutions. In addition, there were preferential credit
programs extended by commercial banks which were funded by the central bank's (BOJ)
rediscount facility to support export, import, manufacturing and agriculture sectors. Total BOJ
lending to commercial banks and other financial institutions for these purposes amounted to more
than 10 percent of total money supply (M2) in the early 1950s. The heavy government
intervention in credit allocation during the wartime influenced the postwar relationship between
the government and banks, which continued close consultation and maintained a cooperative
relationship.
In the pre-war period, there were many public firms, but after the 1945, most of
the industrial firms were privately owned, except for some key strategic industries. Banks and
firms were interrelated through direct ownership within larger family groups in the case of pre-
war Zaibatsus, and through substantial ownership links in the case of postwar Keiretsus. These
large industrial conglomerates have assumed dominant positions in the Japanese economy. But
even firms that did not belong to a Keiretsu had "main banks" which held equity participation
and representation on the fums' boards. Small firms typically had a subcontracting relation with
a large firms which gave the latter certain control over their business. There were various
"deliberative councils" which were represented by the managers of industrial firms, bankers, and
former senior govemment officials which provided channels for discussion of policies and
mobilized consensus for the policies put forward by the government. Various industry
associations also transmitted the flow of information and policy objectives between the industries
and the governments. The government had a complicated web of leverages Lo control or
L61 See Nakamura (1983), pp. 299-300.
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influence the behaviors of firrns and banks.
Korean Structure: In Korea, banks (both specialized and commercial ones) were owned directly
by the government.'7 More than half of total bank credit was directed explicitly or implicitly
under various types of selective credit programs. In the early stages of economic development
(1950s and 1960s), public enterprises were quite dominant in the industrial sector. They were
gradually privatized, being taken over by large industrial groups (Chaebols) which acquired
dominant roles in the Korean economy starting in the 1960s. The Korean industrial sector could
be broadly divided into, on the one hand, about 30 to 50 large chaebols"S which had firms
producing goods and services in almost all industries, and, on the other hand, a still large
number of smaller firms. As in Japan, many of the smaller firms had subcontracting relations
with large firms. The large industrial groups typically had a close relationship with the
government. They strongly depended on its bank loans for the expansion of their business.
Korea also had various "industry associations" which facilitated the consultation of policy
direction and implementation, channeled market information to the government, and assisted in
the effective transmission of policy goals to ir.tustrial activities. It also had "Monthly Briefings
on Economic Trends" and "Monthly Export Promotion Meetings" which were chaired by the
President and attended by senior government officials, bankers, business and labor-union leaders.
By attending the economic briefings presented by the EPB, all the participants shared a common
understanding of current economic conditions and issues.
In the monthly export promotion meeting, the Ministry of Trade and Industry
(MTI) would make reports not only regarding the progress on achieving annual export targets,
but also the problems and difficulties facing the industries and firms in meeting their export
goals. The performance of exports were reviewed item by item and country by country in the
meeting. As in the case of the Monthly Economic Brieling Mleeting, decisions were often made
on the spot as to how problems might be addressed. In addition, the meetings were utilized to
recognize those individuals and firms who had made outstanding contributions toward achieving
export targets. After discussions about the bottlenecks for exports or progress of specific
projects at these meetings, the President gave instructions as to how the problems should be
resolved, and asked all participants, including government officials, bankers, and the
representatives from the private sector, for their cooperation and input. These meetings
constituted a forum, both among ministries and between the government and the private sector,
Li/ Even after their privatization in the early 1980s, rhe government continued to exercive strong control over
their management end credit allocation.
WF As of 1985, the largest 30 chaeboLs received more than a quarter of the total bank credit and were
responsibkfcr more than half of the manufacturing output.
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where progress towards achieving policy goals was monito.ed and where consensus could be
achieved on ways to deal with emerging problems.
We may say broadly that the GLIO) involved the government, bank, and large
industrial groups in Korea. A very similar arrangement can be noted for Japan. However, for
post-war Japan, we witness a looser affiliation between the govemment, banks, and large
industrial firms. The GLIO was complemented by strong private internal organizations that
linked the banks and industrial firms more closely. In post-war Japan, the role of government
was more indirect, where the private sector could make mostly independent decisions, but
cooperated with each other and through the govemment. Furthermore, in both countries the role
of the government diminished as the countries industrialized and as the private sector expanded
its own internal market. This devolutionary process happened earlier, and went further in Japan
than in Korea.
2.2. The Incentive Environment for Banks
Thie institutional setting in Japan and Korea provided different incentive structures
to banks and firms from what normally can be expected under the free competitive financial
market. In Korea, bank ownership implied that the government could dictate the objectives of
bank operations closely. Since bank managers were appointed by the government, their
incentives were determined by the hierarchy. Performance evaluation was not based on narrow
indicators, such as profit maximization; a manager's most important incentive was to conform
to the policy guidelines established by the government. That is, the manager carefully executed
government directives and prudently avoided visible failures such as large loan defaults.'9
The profit motive for banks may not be always consistent with the goal of long-
term economic growth as was mentioned in Section 2. This concern, with that of financial
instability, led the govemment not to emphasize n.arket competition and profit-maximization
among banks. Instead, maximization of deposit mobilization to support industrial investment
was the major objective set to bank managers. With controlled interest rates, which were set
to reduce the risk of financial instability and to encourage investment, deposit mobilization
needed particular efforts by the banks.
On the lending side, the interest rate controls prevent lenders from charging
appropriate risk premia, resulting in a bias for low default risk projects irrespective of the
expected economic return of projects. But there were directed credits to certain targeted high
Le The same situation prevailed in Taiwan (China), where all banks were owned by government.
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risk sectors, so that total risk taking within the GLIO was probably higher than what would have
resulted in an otherwise imperfect capiial market. There were moral hazard problems, however,
for the banks managers since they would not be directly held responsible for all bad loan
decisions. Nevertheless, they were pressed to monitor their loans closely, were held directly
accountable for the success of their discretionary lending and were encouraged to make the
directed loans profitable.20
Compared to Korea, post-war Japan offered smaller subsidies and the directed
credits were smaller. Japanese commercial banks also operated in a more competitive
environment. In post-war Japan, the old industrial conglomerates (Zaibatsus) quickly reemerged
under somewhat different forms (Keiretsus), and industrial firms clustered around main banks,
with which they had a close monitoring relationship. The government may have felt less
compelled to intervene by directing credit explicitly since this institutional environment could
overcome market imperfections to some extent. But the incentive environment of banks was still
influenced by the government. Private ban.Ks were given incentives to support the government
initiatives, such as lending to the same firms or sectors as the government financial institutions
by participating in syndicated loans organized by the JDB. The private banks also paid close
attention to the administrative guidance of the MOF and BOJ because they depended on
discretionary decisions of the government, such as branch licensing and overloans. I
One aspect common to the Japanese and Korean financial systems is cooperation
and bargaining (which are attributes of the GLIO) among stakeholders.22 Cooperation or
bargaining has been used during times of financial distress, where stakeholders have stronger
incentives to rescue and restructure ailing firmns, rather than force socially unproductive
liquidations that benefit some stakeholders at the expense of others.23 The coordination among
stakeholders in normal times is equally important. By cooperating, stakeholders can exercise
The moral hazard problem of bad loans was however far from being completely solved . The Korean
government had to use interest rate concessions and other credit interventions repeatedly to salvage ailing
parts of the highly leveraged corporate sector (Cho and Kim, 1993).
Li In Japan, more so than in Korea, the exact went and na are of government influence over thefinancial
sector is hard to assess. The disc'retionary nature of government policy involves many degrees of subtlety,
and lack of transparency, at least to outside observers.
By stakeholders we mean all external agents affected by the performance of the firm: equity and debt
holders, some suppliers (often holders of trade credit) and possibly the government.
However, the distribution of responsibilities differs between countries. In Korea, the government assumed
a much more explicit role. In Japan, resporn..bilities for a rescue operation were delegated to the main
bank, which needed to defend its reputation (see Sheard (1991), Aolk (1992)).
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stronger monitoring; all stakeholders benefit from one stakeholder's monitoring activity.
Coordination is also important to exercise influence over a particular firm: a united front of
stakeholders represents greater power to affect a firn's governance. Cooperation and
coordination among stakeholders allows for stronger incentives to firm managers to be
implemented. Inherent contradictions in the formulation of incentives (for example, debt-holders
would like to provide more conservative incentives than equity-holders) are more likely to be
reconciled, and tighter control over the firm's governance are likely to ma'te incentive structures
more effective.
2.3. The Incentive Eavironment for Firms
The government's position as i creditor (either directly through bank ownership
as in Korea, or indirectly through influence over the banling system as in Japan) can generate
different incentive structures for firms than those that could have been expected without the
government. Asset or growth-maximization of firms can be understood as a strategy of long-run
profit maximization in the presence of dynamic increasing returns to scale and technological
externalities. if an emerging firm or industry is operating on a leaming curve, short-term profits
can be poor. However, creditors in the competitive market tend to induce firms to bias their
investment away from projects with long-term pay-off horizons toward projects with shorter
horizons.'4
Furthermore, the govemment as a creditor can be a more effective monitor and
enforcer of a firm's behavior than private creditors. Private creditors in the competitive market
can withdraw credit if they are not satisfied with a firm's performance. The withdrawal of
credit may not be crucial for the firm's survival if the firm can approach other creditors or other
sources of financing. However, if the govemment is dissatisfied with a firm's performance and
withdraws its support, the firms may not survive since the government might not only cut off
official credit, but also use further punitive measures against the borrowers.Y5 Therefore, the
government can become a more powerful creditor in the GLIO context than private creditors in
enforcing the behavior of borrowers to conform to the interest of creditors.
The government can also become a more effective risk partner than private
investors. Once a firm follows the government's policy guidance, the govemment becomes an
implicit risk partner in the investment outcomes. The government secures continued credit
w# See Hellmann (1992).
/ 7This was especially the case in Korea. In Japan, the government had a much weaker influence on these
matenrs.
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support for firms, and bails out firms in financial distress. The government can become a more
powerrll 1 .r- . ) tner by combining various policy measures with credit support to alleviate firm
lk ,es X economic downturns or temporary poor performance. Equity finance is normally
the-ugai w provide risk sharing to firms. In the GLIO context, bank credit could constitute the
source of risk capital. Even with high leveraged financial structures, large industrial groups
could make risky ventures and could use long-term perspectives in their investment decisions,
given that there is implicit downside risk insurance by the government and banks.26 In other
words, the gov"rment-bank-industry coinsurance scheme has bank credit supplementing risk
capital in the ausence of a well-functioning equity market. This, however, also nurtured moral
hazard, where firms overexpanded their investment and chose highly leveraged financial
stmictures.
2.4. The Policy Environment: Internal and External Consistency
Another inmortant institutional aspect of credit policy is external consistency, that
is, how well policies fit into the larger frame of government economic policies to support
industrialization and development. While a complete treatment of the issues is beyond the scope
of the paper, the institutional arrangement of the GLIO could have helped to achieve greater
external consistency.
The Japanese and Korean governments achieved coordination among credit
programs with closely related indus'rial and macro-economic policies. If the domestic macro-
economic environment was hampered by a particular policy (for example, by high intlation or
an overvalued exchange rate), losses began to appear in the GLIO's balance sheets. The
govemment, in a comprehensive relationship with banks and firms, had clear information and
incentives to redirect policies to benefit the GLIO. Losses by firms would be reflected in the
growing non-performing loans of banks, which would add to the quasi-fiscal deficit. Bad
industrial and macroeconomic policies had at least some chance of being recognized and
correrted swiftly within the GLIO.'
An outward-oriented economic policy and a competitive domestic industrial
& From the borrower's point of view, high leverage can be also viewed as insurance against burcsruptcy. The
more they borrowfrom the banks, the more the creditors (gowrnment/banks) are obliged to bail them out
in the downside risk, On the other hand, the high leverage also strengdsens the governance control by
providing leverage to the creditor to the extent it can directly affect the survival of thefirrms.
L71 No organization is perfect. Indeed, the Korean government has been criticized for unduly neglecting small
firms. Thisfits into the framework Insofar as these smallfirms were not parn of the GLIO, they could not
beefit from the same attention from the government.
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environment also checked the effectiveness of credit policies in Japan and Korea. Firms were
fully exposed to competitive international markets for their products and keenly contested among
large firms. The firms' success depenued on expansion in foreign markets. Thus internal
selection and incentive mechanisms in the GLIO were complemented with the external discipline
from international markets, where the performance of firms provided important information for
the allocation of credit within the GLIO. Japanese and Korean governments also avoided state.
owned enterprises and monopolies, and ensured intense competition in the domestic market
,' among large firms although the market share were highly concentrated by them.
3. The Internal Organization View of Credit Allocation
Effective credit policies in Japan and Kor -- psrticularly in Korea--can be
interpreted as part of an allocation process within an internal organization, as an attempt to
overcome some market imperfections. In this section we discuss the analytical foundations of
what we have called the GLIO.28 Section 3.1 examines at the foundations of this concept and
section 3.2 discusses its implications.
3.1 rCredit Policies as Internal Credit Allocation: Conceptual Issues
In the orthodox view of credit policy (and governmcnt policy), the government
is an agent separated from the market transactions, and adjusts economic parameters, such as
prices. Government failures, then, involve poor information, distorted incentives and
opportunities for abuse and corruption among bureaucrats. This view, which dichotomizes the
economy into a productive sector on the one hand and the government on the other hand, may
not always be an appropriate way to understand the government's role, particularly in Japan anid
Korea. Instead, we propose a more participatory view of the government as an active leader in
establishing and managing internal credit allocation.
What distinguishes internal allocations from those in markets? This have been the
focus of considerable research in the literature on the theory of the firm and the theory of
organizations, dating back at least to Coase (1937). His fundamental insight was that there may
be costs of using the market, so that allocation occurring within firms (i.e., internal
organizations) may be a way of overcoming high transaction costs in markets.29 Coase
considered the difference between markets and firms to be the use of the price system. This
' nThis section develops an essentially static view of the GLIO. In section 4 we address the dvnatmic aspects.
The subsequent literature, including the theories of market failures and imperfection discussed in section
1.1, has given considerably more contert to the concept of transaction costs.
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distinction is inadequate however, since prices may well be used within organizations, e.g.,
transfer prices, and market transactions may include non-price features (e.g., contractual side
conditions). Another popular notion is that an internal organization is characterized by the
centralization of control.30 Again, this notion is insufficient, as it fails to recognize that one
crucial aspect of internal organization is the ability to decentralize ii,ternally.
Rather than prices or centralization of control, modern economic theory argues
that markets and internal organizations differ in the way decision rights are distributed.3 ' In
the market, each participant holds decision rights, while in an internal organization, decision
rights are held by a central unit that can impose decisions on the various parts of the internal
organization. There are also some constraints on the center's ability to impose decisions and
it may decide not to exercise many of its decision rights, or to exercise them selectively.
Consequently, in order to understand the concept of the GLIO, we need to
recognize both the extent to which the govemment could exercise direct and indirect control over
economic decision making and the extent of the constraints it faces. Government influence over
decision rights concerned strategic planning, mainly investment decisions. The most important
means of exercising this control is through credit allocation. By granting or refusing finance,
governments could provide on-going selection and incentives to borrowers. At the same time,
we should recognize the limitations to govemment control. First, decision control is indirect
and delegated.32 Second, there is an important notion that if the government wants to use its
control over credit allocation to expedite growth, the government depends fundamentally on the
collaboration of banks and firms.33 In a credit relationship, the lender is tied to the borrower
because the lender wants to recover funds. The fact that banks and the government rely on
firms thus gives firms important bargaining power. But decision control in the GLIO differs
from the decision control found in private internal organizations or firrms. In private transactions
La, The Coasian notion of suppression of the price mechanism is then one possible but not necessary feature
of an organization.
AL' Just as for evcry imporant theory, there is also considerable disagreement in the literature. Our
description it based mostly on the ideas in Grossman-Hari (1986) and Willianson (1985). Forfurther
references on this topic see also Milgrom-Roberts (1992).
This corresponds closely to the M-formn hierarchy' (see Williamson 1985), an organization based on the
idea that, apart from broad strategic planning, there should be considerable decentralization within the
organizational structure. Units are grouped alongfunctional criteria and given autonomy on how to achieve
set objectives. In the GLIO, banks are respor.viblefor implementing the broad guidelines of credit policies,
',ut are given considerable freedom as to how they achieve this objective.
tRelated to this is the notion that government interference must be perceived to be legitimate by private
agents in order to befeasible or effective.
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with complete property rights, ownership rights determine the control over decision rights. But
with incomplete property rights or government interference, decision rights may be exercised
without formal ownership. Within the GLIO, government control went beyond control o' the
public sector and beyond the formulation of parametric policies3' to governance control. In
other words, the government controls some decision rights commonly associated with ownership.
The resulting picture on the extent of governance control inevitably becomes
vague. It is not clear where decision rights lie within the GLIO or how they are shared in
commonly agreed decision making. The relationships within the GLIO (especially in Japan) are
subtle, often implicit, and are not readily verifiable or observable to the outsider. More
fundamentally, vagueness is an integral aspect of the GLIO. It is part of an evolving bargaining
or strategic game between government, banks and firms, where the distribution of decision rights
is neither well specified nor time-invariant.35
Having described the ways internal credit allocation differs from market
allocation, we can formally define the GLIO as the nexus of all banks and firms that are under
some partial govemment control, which derives mainly from and accompanies the allocation of
credit.
3.2 Credit Policies as Internal Credit Allocation: Consequences
How does it matter that credit policies are implemented within GLIO? How does
the allocation of credit differ from allocation in a market-based system? We look at the
consequences of intemal allocation along four aspects: risk-sharing, information structure,
provision of incentives, and governance structure.
Risk-sharing. Improved risk-sharing is one of the most important justifications
for internal organizations. If information and markets were perfect, govemment-backed risk
sharing would not be needed. But in the absence of weli-functioning equities market, investment
expansion had to be financed by bank credit, which led to highly leveraged financial structure
of firms. In this situation, implicit govemment-banks-industry co-insurance scheme could reduce
the risk of investment. The major problem with intemal risk-sharing is that, unless effective
&' In other words, regutoiions, price controls, etc., but not actual decisions.
It is interesting to note that both Williamson (1985) and Grossman-Hart (1986) make explicit reference that
their definition of an organization (which does not allowfor the ambiguities, on which we insisted here)
only applies to private Osovereign t rransactions. They implicitly seem to recognize that a clear distribution
of decision rights may not exist in the presence of govwrnment.
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monitoring and proper incentives are provided, it may lead to its own moral hazard problem,
namely soft-budgeting.36
Apalrt from this argument conceming exogenous risk, another argument can be
made that intermal organizations are also instrumental in reducing endogenous risk. While neo-
classical economics assumes that equilibrium is obtained, actual markets involve disequilibrium,
strategic uncertainties and constant adjustments. In the early stages of economic development,
markets may not be very stable, given that market participants may have less experience with
their functioning and given that the institutional roots of the market, such as contract law and
faith in the system, are much weaker. This second type of uncertainty seriously undermines the
well-functioning of markets themselves. In an internal organization however, this second type
of uncertainty can be alleviated as a result of the alternative ways decisions are rmace.
Informational structur~. In market economies prices were often said to reflect
economy-wide scarcities, while allowing for decentralized production and transactions.37
Information in financial markets concerns not only the availability and demand of funds, but
important information about the quality of borrowers and their likelihood to default. The
traditional view of informationally efficient credit markets3" is particularly inappropriate
because it fails to recognize the strategic nature of asymmetries of information that can lead to
considerable market imperfections. Markets screen borrowers and transmit information
imperfectly and may be said to achieve some intermediate level of infornational efficiency.
For the internal credit market, monitoring and an efficient information flow are
two of the most difficult challenges. A network is needed to collect large amounts of dispersed
information about the availability and need for funds, and about the quality of horrowers. The
key here is how efficiently communication is developed and how well monitoring is delegated.
Both Korea and Japan placed wonsiderable emphasis on communication between government,
3L6& There is a trade-off. If a borrowerfaces a soft budget, he will most likely impose some costs of inefficient
refinancing on the lender, but he will also befreedfrom short-terrn pressures that may undermine its ability
to do hidden long-term investments, such as learning (see Hellmann (1992)). In section 4 we argue that
in the early stages of development, learning and long-term investments are important. In this perspective,
the inefficiencies of soft-budgeting might be outweighed by the gains of long-termism.
7/ 7This point of view is associate-d with the Austn'an school: see von Hayek (1945), Hurwicz (1973), and
Grossman (1976). For the counter-argument, see Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) or Greenwald-Stiglitz (1986).
3U 7This does not refer to the efficient capital market hypothesis, which looks only at the market and asks
whether it can process the information efficiently. Thefact that this weaker hypothesis seems tofail in many
situations (for a survey, see Camerer (1989)) is indicative of how important information problems can be
to capital markets.
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banks and firms, such as deliberative councils and monthly economic briefing meeting. They
also placed considerable emphasis on monitoring, the responsibility of which was delegated to
banks. An internal organization may have fewer incentives to withhold or distort information
strategically: the strategic motive may be replaced by an incentive to cooperate on information
exchange, and misrepresentation of information may be punished more severely than in a market
environment.39
Provision of incentives. Incentives in the market are said to result from the
opportunities of individual profit (or utility) maximization, and are directed by relative prices
(such as interest rates). Yet, whenever prices are distorted or markets are missing, incentives
will be distorted. Markets achieve only intermediate efficiency with incentives.
If the incentive structure is well-designed, internal organizations can provide more
intense or more focused incentives. An internal organization can augment the intensity of
incentives directly by increasing monetary or non-monetary rewards for good performance or
increasing punishments for bad performance. in the market, bad performance can only be
punished through termination of economic relationships. An internal organization can also avoid
the biases inherent to markets by choosing among different perforrmance measures to redirect
incentives. For example, Japan and Korea emphasized the growth of firms (or growth of exports
by firms), rather than profits. By emphasizing growth, firms can be freed from pressure to
show short-term profitability and can focus on long-term perspectives.
Incentives within an organization are however also subject to familiar criticism,
such as lack of effort, propensity for corruption, insufficient discipline and lack of innovation.
The design of incentives within an internal organization is therefore extremely delicate. If one
link in the hierarchical chain has distorted incentives, the entire system may run astray. More
important, if at the top of the hierarchy the government and its bureaucrats use the system for
purposes other than to improve the economy, the efficiency of credit allocation will almost
certainly vanish.40 The relatively transparent performance criteria set by export orientation and
The design of efficient information transmission within an internal market is not obvious, however, and
many things can go wrong. In particular, there are very difficult trade-offs as to what inforrnation should
be centralized. Indeed, excessive centralizasion of information is one very important reason why central
planning - which we must however keep clearly aparnfrom the CLIO - hasfailed.
The failure to provide appropriate incentives in credit alloc,.Iion is harmful. There is a particularly wide
scope for opportunism in credit allocation, such as misuse offunds (in other words, funds are used for
inefficient projects, or insufficient effort is provided to make thefunds efficient) and the diversion offunds
for other purposes. However, this is truefor any credit allocation, whether market-based, parametric or
internal. Moreover, incentives for the diversion offunds are likely to be higher in the absence of a GLIO,
when there are fewer institutional safeguards to detect such activities.
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domestic cooperation, the apparent dedication of bureaucrats to economic development and
national welfare, and political leadership in Japan and Korea, although difficult to explain,
certainly contributed to uphold the system.
Governance structure. Just as decision rights differ between markets and internal
organizations, actual decisions differ. Many market inefficiencies--problems of public goods and
externalities, and strategic use of asymmeLic information--may be viewed as a lack of
cooperation and coordination. Markets, almost by definition, lack explicit structures for more
direct interactions between decision makers than would be necessary to achieve the coordination
and cooperation required to overcome inefficiencies; prices are supposed to do the entire job."'
Within the GLIO cooperation and coordination should be the result of explicit and
pervasive efforts to bring consensus among divergent opinions and objectives. The government
can not only promote consensus, but it can provide direct incentives (both "sticks" and "carrots")
to achieve cooperation and coordination. This also helps for the formulation of and adherence
to commonly understood group objectives.42
Summarizing these four points, we can say that internalizing transactions within
an organization has the potential to achieve a better allocation than in the market. However at
the same time there is a significant danger of ending up with a far worse ailocation."3 Whether
or not good or bad outcomes occur is not just a matter of luck, but depends on a host of
preconditions, such as common national goals, political leadership to convince the firms and
consumers to sl,are burden for such goals, the stage of the economic development, and the
!a/ We are assuming that there is no perfect contra -ring in markets, or else coordination and cooperation could
be bought and sold in the market (c.f. Coase (1960)). Accepting imperfeci contracting, one may
nevertheless objec, that agents in a market-based system still have the option of creating coalitions to
address specific problems of rooperation and coordinaxion. A coalition organizes its operations internally;
thus, in a stricr definitional sense, cooperation and coordination is again achieved through internal
organization. Moreover, even with the option of coalition fornation, a market system may have
disadvantages. Coalitions areformed ex-post as a response to a given crisis (if they arefirmly in place e=-
ante they should be considered to be an internal organization). They are likely to beformed too late and
be less effective; since their members have little information on each other and no experience in working
together, they are not engaged in long-term relationships and cannot rely on the same reputation
enforcement mechanisms.
V2/ One aspect that also seems to have contributed to this in Japan and Korea is relatively high degree of
cultural homogeneity within the workforce.
' Although in a very model-specific context, Sah-Stiglitz (1986) actually prove a proposition to this effectt.
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quality of economic management.44
4. D;m;nishing Merits of Credit Policies Over Time: From GLIO to PLIOs
The merias of credit policies and GLIOs diminishes as economic development
advances, as happened in Japzi and Korea. The govemment's role changed according to the
dynamics of economic development: industry expanded while direct government involvement in
economic activities decreased. Governments did not withdraw from direct intervention suddenly,
but transferred control gradually to the private sector, especially the big conglomerates, which
we may think of as "privately-led internal organizations" (PLIOs).45
An economy in the early stage of development is characterized by a structural
deficit of inadequate human capital. pc.r knowledge about existing technologies and insufficient
expertise in managing firms and )ther econL iic institutions. A development strategy depends
heavily on leaming and adaption of'txisting tec.inologies. Other than production techniques, this
also involves learning and adaptation of economic institutions, one being the institution of
markets themselves. Given the p.-,lic good character of technological and institutional
knowledge or expertise, and giver, tne externalities associated with learning, the comparative
advantages of the GLIO may be particularly prominent during the early stages of development,
when a country is focussed on matching other countries' successful experiences.
At more advanced stages of economic development, the role of the GLIO
diminishes. Innovation supersedes learning and adaptation as an engine of growth. Because the
environment must support individual entrepreneurship and innovation, an internal organization
may fail to provide the correct incentives for innovation, especially since (intellectual) property
rights within the intemal organization tend to be vaguely defined. The consensus on the
direction of a development strategy is likely to erode, and different fractions of society become
more likely to push for their own socio-economic agendas, which put less emphasis on national
economic growth.
i4 Human capital is also an important condition, in particular, among the bureaucrats responsibkfor unning
the system. There also seems to be an aspect of multiple self-perpetuating equilibria: if economic
management is good, the succss of the organizational structure will perpetuate and trust and reputation
mechanims will develop within the system. If economic management is bad, the organization will enter into
a perpetuating cycle of mitrust and corruption.
An impor.ant distinction between GLIOs and the PLIOs is that the PLIOs canfind themselves incompetition
with each other. However, escep: in the later stages of economic dewelopment, the distinction between the
PLIOs and the GLIO is not absolute insofar *s the PLJOs were part of the GLIO.
- 24 -
This argument may explain the diminished usefulness of the GLIO as the Japanese
and Korean economies developed. The more subtle issue is whether only the role of government
(GL) or the entire institutional approach (10) diminished in importance. We argue that the GL
became dispensable at higher stages of economic development, whereas the IO adapted to the
changes in the economic environment with the expansion of PLIOs.
At the earlier stages of development the Japanese and Korean governments, which
were both staffed with very capable bureaucrats, were the only economic forces with the
organizational capacity to pool the necessary resources to establish and maintain an institutional
framework such as the GLIO. But after institutional arrangements had been developed and the
private sector had the expertise to organize economic activity, there were many options to reduce
the government's involvement, One clear advantage of private institutions was that control over
economic activity was better insulated from political misuse. The transfer of control to the
PLIOs had the advantage of maintaining some of the institutional advantages of intemal
organization, while relaxing the government's grip on the economy at the sam.e time.
One should however be careful about generalizations concerning these
devolutionary process. First, the transition from GLIOs to PLIOs, that we observe in Japan and
Korea may have been a very country-specific experience. Whether in general a GLIO or a
PLIO is more effective to foster economic development depends largely on the particular
circumstances,'4 and in particular on the government's determination to use the GLIO for the
purpose of expediting growth. If the government is likely to abuse any such arrangement as the
GLIO, the outcome of resource allocation and growth would be poorer than those the imperfect
markets.
Second the speed and extent of the devolutionary process could be slowed by
several factors. Economic efficiency may not be its only determinant. Reduced govemment
involvement in the economy runs contrary to the vested interest of corporate firms that have
iy Al least in the abstract, one can think of the possibility of an 'optimal' size of a GLIO. The issue is
complex and controversial, so thai we limit ourselves ro a brief and simplified note here. Suppose that a
GLIO has a committed leadership. if there are gradually decreasing returns to scoie for a GLIO, then,
ceteris paribr s (in particular holding the degree of centralization of the GLIO constant), economic growth
of the GLIO will bring it eventually to the point of diminished returns. This happens even faster if the
optimal size of the GLIO (again holding degree of centralization constarnt) diminishes over time as markets
become more sophisticated. Thus, at some point, the GLIO should either be split into several parts or
should relax its degree of centralization (both seem true for the chan8z from GLIO to PLlOs)
One implication of this argwnent would be that the GLIO is morefeasible in small economies. Loosely
speaking, the exampleu of Japan and Korea support the argument: they were both relatively smaU
economies at the beginning of their economic expansion.
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relied upon government supports to expand or at least preserve their activities. The corporate
firms, under the government - bank - industry co-insurance arrangements, have operated in a
highly leveraged financial structure. Therefore, the firms have become vulnerable to economic
downturns without continued govemment support. Also, bureaucrats have an incentive to create
importance for their own operations. Bureaucrats have no interest in acknowledging when
government expansion becomes unwarranted or when government activities are no longer
necessary.47
Because these administrative obstinacies are well understood and involve political,
rather than economic, analysis, we do not discuss them here. However in the long-run these
problems may have constituted significant inefficiencies in the Japanese and Korean financial
systems, and would certainly be relevant in other developing countries.4
Summary and Conclusion
Japan and Korea's economic successes are widely acknowledged and many have
suggested links between economic success and industrial policies, especially policy interventions
in credit. These contrasts with the widely-held perception that directed credit programs have
failed in other developing countries.
Many explanations have been given for economic growth in Japan and Korea: the
governments' strong commitment to growth, the stability of the administrations, an outward-
oriented development strategy, well-educated and disciplined labor forces, and the social and
cultural environment. While we appreciate these aspects, we pursued a complementary but
methodologically different approach. Starting from a perspective of the new institutional
economics, we attempt to provide an alternative framework for understanding credit policies.
7his is related to the problem of administrative capture, when bureaucrats collude with their respective
clients. Capture threatens one of the mtajor advantages oft CLIO: its flexibiliry. This is certainly trme for
the a!location of credit, where departments become accustomed to dealing with their group of borrowers
and tend to represent the interests of the borrowers within the government. Capture is also dynamic in the
sense that bureaucrats and industry gradually learn to develop surreptitious long-term relationships (c.f.
7irole (1986)).
To quote the former prime minister of Korea (Nam, D. W (, 992):
'It is difficult to do full justice to the Korean experience, but my observation is that the government
intervention was not only desirable but also inevitable in the early stage of economic take-off, and
that the scope and method of government intervention should have been changed over time more
swiftty in response to changing conditions in later stages of developmeru.
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The central argument of the paper is that credit policies in Japan and Korea
benefitted from close consultation, cooperation, and monitoring between the government, banks,
and i.ldustries within the larger context of what we have call-d the "government-led internal
organization" (GLIO). Government credit intervention during their early stages of economic
development can be interpreted as an internal transaction within the GLIO, and may be
interpreted as an efficient response to pervasive credit market imperfections.
We define the GLIO loosely as formal and informal institutions in which banks
and firms operate in close partnership with government. We examine the distinctive properties
of intemal organization as an alternative mode cf economic transactions to markets. The internal
organization may overcome some market imperfections and improve the informational structure
in the economy. provide stronger and better directed incentives, and, most important, foster
ccooperation and coordination among business, banks, and government because of its more
explicit governance structure.
We describe the incentive structure which induced banks and firms to comply with
the long-term industrial policy goals of GLIO. Firms were given the opportunity for long-term
investments and could benefit from implicit govemment-bank downside risk insurance. Banks
weme given strong incentives to mobilize deposits and the lending were encouraged to maintain
close long-term monitoring relationships.
Credit policies in Japan and Korea could be effective tools for industrial policy
since implementation allowed for a flexible selection of the recipients of implicit subsidies, for
governance control that induced industrialists' compliance with government policies, and for
risk-sharing between government and business. Their effectiveness, however, owed much to the
institutional environment in which they were implemented.
The GLIOs also featured remarkable external consistency. Credit policies were
effectively coordinated and were integrated into macro policies and development strategies.
Because the government was directly involved in the economy, it was more likely to recognize
and correct early policy distortions that damaged the industrial sector. Furthermore, the
outard-orientation of the Japanese and Korean economy meant that external discipline affected
the performance of firms within the GLIO, and was complemented by internal competition.
In Japan and Korea, there has been a gradual devolution of the role of
government, coupled with the rising importance of unregulated (or less regulated) segments of
financial market and large conglomerates - "privately-led intemal organizations" (PLIOs).
During the early stages of economic development, the GLIO was compatible with the need to
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leamn and adapt existing technologies. But later, it began to hamper more innovative economic
activity. In early economic development, the government could also be at a comparative
advantage to overcome market imperfections, but later, private agents became more able to run
internal organizations. The devolutionary process, however, is hampered by resistance of
bureaucratic bodies and vested interest grr ips. Thus, there is a fundamental problem: how to
phase out a system against entrenched interests?
Common national goals, capable and dedicated bureaucrats, homogenous
population, and cohesion among social elites may have made GLIO approach particularly
successful in Japan and Korea. Moreover, differences in Japan's and Korea's approaches
indicate that the finer details of institutional structures may vary considerably. The most striking
lesson that arises from Korea's and Japan's early experiences, however, is that once government
decides to use credit policies to support its industrial growth strategies, it should recognize that
it is crucial to establish and maintain an institutional environment that allows their effective
implementation. It was the comprAhensive involvement of the government, that went well
beyond the simple provision of subsidized credit programs and encompassed the governance over
the major participants in the development drive (both banks and firms) that seems to differentiate
the Japanese and Korean experiences with credit policies from those in other countries.
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